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Abstract 
The advantage of becoming an industry leader is widely studied. However, how can we measure it? This paper 
measures how much premium an industry leader has in its valuation through a P/E ratio. The findings suggest 
industry leaders have significantly higher P/E ratios by 0.65 than their peers. The analysis of earnings forecasts 
suggests this is not due to their high earnings growth potentials but from other sources. However, in stock 
recommendations, the premium is not recognised by analysts but interpreted as the sign of over-valuation. The 
paper contributes the new structure of a P/E ratio by identifying the industry leader premium. 
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Introduction 
Most companies strive to become the number one company in the industry and customers remember who they are. The 
advantages of becoming an industry leader are widely studied including the economies of scale, high bargaining power to 
suppliers and customers, customers’ brand awareness and loyalty, and transition cost to other brands. Obviously, such 
advantages add value to an industry leader. How can we quantify this value? Do we even recognize it when valuing an 
industry leader? This paper addresses these questions from the perspective of shareholders (owners) using a 
price/earnings (P/E) ratio and measures a premium an industry leader has in its stock price. 
In regard to a P/E ratio, there are three plausible but conflicting hypotheses. Firstly, as P/E ratios represent the earnings 
growth potentials of companies (Penman, 1996), small companies tend to have high earnings growth potentials and P/E 
ratios. Secondly, companies in the same industry tend to have the same P/E ratios as they also represent the degree of 
over/under-valuation of stock prices. Finally, industry leaders, companies with the largest market shares, tend to have high 
P/E ratios because they take advantage of premiums they have. The first two hypotheses imply there is no industry leader 
premium, while the third one indicates so. This paper investigates which hypothesis dominates and measures the industry 
leader premium if it exists.  
The research starts with analysing the general trend of P/E ratios along company ranks and how the trend changes as 
companies are divided into large-three, large-medium and small companies. Afterwards, the analyses of analyst earnings 
forecasts, target prices and recommendations are conducted to investigate how analysts consider industry leaders. 
The main finding is all three hypotheses coexist in an industry. In general, smaller companies tend to have higher P/E ratios 
consistent with the first hypothesis. However, when companies are divided into large and small companies, the positive 
increase in P/E ratios appears to be due to a structural difference in P/E ratios between large and small companies and, 
within each group, the increase is minimal supporting the second hypothesis. When large companies are subdivided into 
the three largest and other large companies, the three largest companies have higher P/E ratios than other large companies 
both economically and statistically, supporting the industry leader premium hypothesis. Overall, the low P/E ratios of large 
companies mainly relate to other large companies and, in fact, the three largest companies have P/E ratios as high as small 
companies. The results indicate industry leaders have a premium of 0.65 of their P/E ratios compared to their peers. 
However, when analyst forecasts are examined, the industry leader premium is not recognised by analysts but instead 
regarded as the sign of over-valuation. 
The paper contributes to the current knowledge of a P/E ratio by identifying the distinctive characteristics of industry leaders. 
Although the current understanding of a P/E ratio generally prevails, industry leaders experience higher P/E ratios than 
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their peers due to the industry leader premium. The practical implication for analysts is to recognise the industry leader 
premium when valuing industry leaders before concluding that their high P/E ratios mean they are over-valued. 
The paper proceeds in the following order: hypotheses and models are built up in a methodology part in section 2; data are 
explained in section 3; and section 4 explains findings, followed by conclusion in section 5. 
Methodology 
The research first studies the general trend of P/E ratios along company ranks, followed by changes in trend when 
companies are divided into large-three, large-medium and small companies. Based on the market definition of an industry 
leader - a company with the largest market share - companies are ranked based on their sales. A company with the largest 
sales is considered an industry leader and ranks first, followed by a company with the second largest sales ranks second, 
and so on. Because the ranks of companies are changing year-on-year depending on their performances, the research 
conducts the cross-sectional analysis based on ranks, instead of the panel-data analysis based on companies. 
The general trend of P/E ratios along ranks is measured by model (1) as, 
𝑃 𝐸⁄ = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 + 𝛾𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛿𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 + 𝜀                                                      (1) 
where Leverage and DivPayout are added as control variables due to their impact on P/E ratios (R.S. Bower and D.H. 
Bower, 1969; Leibowitz, 2002; Malkiel, 1970). 
Companies are afterwards divided equally into large and small companies and their P/E ratios are measured by model (2) 
as, 
𝑃 𝐸⁄ = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 + 𝛾𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛿𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 + 𝜀                                   (2) 
where Large is a binomial variable of 1 if a company is in the large group, and 0 in the small group. 
To measure the industry leader premium, large companies are subdivided into large-three (i.e., three largest) and large-
medium companies (i.e., other large companies). Therefore, Model (3) is measured as,  
𝑃 𝐸⁄ = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒3 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑀𝑒𝑑 + 𝛾𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛿𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 + 𝜀      (3) 
where Large3 is a binomial variable of 1 if a company is one of the three largest companies, and 0 otherwise. LargeMed is 
also a binomial variable of 1 if a company is one of the other large companies, and 0 otherwise. 
Model (4) is identical to model (3) only different in a baseline intercept. Whilst model (1) – (3) use small companies as a 
baseline intercept, model (4) uses large-medium companies as a base. The reason for the change is to examine the 
statistical significance of the industry leader premium directly between large-three and large-medium companies. 
𝑃 𝐸⁄ = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒3 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 + 𝛾𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛿𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 + 𝜀             (4) 
where Small is a binomial variable of 1 if a company is in the small group, and 0 otherwise. 
For analyst forecasts, the same model (1) – (4) are used but replacing P/E with one-year ahead earnings forecasts, two-
year ahead earnings forecasts, target prices and recommendations, respectively. Moreover, the two control variables are 
omitted because the analysis is a forecast analysis of a dependent variable when ranks change, instead of a causality 
analysis. 
Three hypotheses are tested in this paper. Firstly, if a P/E ratio is an indicator of earnings growth potential as the current 
knowledge suggests, smaller companies would have higher earnings growth potentials and therefore higher P/E ratios. 
H1: P/E ratios increase as ranks increase. 
On the other hand, the second hypothesis views a P/E ratio from a valuation perspective: identical companies should have 
the identical P/E ratios, and similar companies should have similar P/E ratios. As peer companies are often found from the 
same industry, the second hypothesis suggests companies in the same industry would have similar or same P/E ratios, 
especially between similar companies, otherwise arbitrageurs will take advantage of the deviations equalising the levels. 
H2: P/E ratios stay the same notwithstanding the increase in ranks especially between similar ranks. 
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Finally, the third hypothesis indicates industry leaders enjoy premiums that other companies do not, such as the economies 
of scale functioning as the entry barrier, high bargaining power and customers’ brand awareness. Although such benefits 
may not directly link to their future earnings, they clearly add value as either a protection mechanism against competition 
or a building block for future growth. The third hypothesis suggests such additional benefits would be reflected in company 
valuation as premiums and, therefore, industry leaders would have higher P/E ratios than their peers. 
H3: P/E ratios of industry leaders are higher than those of their peers.  
Data 
The research studies European companies covered by Thomson One Banker between 2002 and 2011. All accounting data, 
except the GICS sub-industry classification, are obtained from Datastream (Worldscope). The GICS sub-industry 
classification is obtained from Thomson One Banker due to the unavailability in Datastream. Analyst forecasts (i.e., current 
earnings-per-share, one/two-year ahead earnings forecasts, target prices and recommendations) are acquired from 
I/B/E/S. For the selection of industry classification, I have considered ICB, ISIC, SIC, GICS and I/B/E/S SIG code. Visual 
inspection confirms the GICS sub-industry classification is the most appropriate to identify homogeneous companies and, 
therefore, industry classification in this paper is based on the GICS sub-industry classification.  
Variables are calculated as follows. Rank is measured based on company’s market share, calculated as company’s sales 
divided by the total sales of the industry in which a company belongs in the year. A company with the largest market share 
ranks first and the second largest ranks second, and so on. Leverage is measured as total debt to equity. For earnings 
forecasts and target prices, relative forecasts are used instead of absolute forecasts to eliminate the scale effect. Therefore, 
relative one-year ahead earnings forecasts are measured as one-year ahead earnings forecasts (EPS1) divided by current 
earnings (EPS). The same applies for two-year ahead earnings forecasts. Relative target prices are calculated as target 
prices divided by current prices. Recommendations scale from 1 (strong buy) through 3 (hold) to 5 (strong sell).  
One important factor in dealing with P/E ratios and forecast variables is how to handle outliers. Two stage measures are 
implemented to mitigate the impact of outliers. In the variable level, P/E ratios of top and bottom 5% are truncated to remove 
outliers. For one-year ahead earnings forecasts, EPS1 and EPS are each truncated at top and bottom 1%, followed by a 
further top and bottom 1% truncation in relative earnings forecasts (EPS1/EPS). The same applies for two-year ahead 
earnings forecasts and target prices. In the general level, median is used to average variables instead of mean. 
10 years’ figures are averaged using median and these averaged variables are used in the analysis. Although the averaging 
appears to be a loss of data, this research is based on the cross-sectional analysis that does not require the panel-data 
set. This is because the research is based on the ranks of companies, not companies themselves, and the ranks of 
companies change year-on-year depending on companies’ performances. Instead of conducting 10 separate cross-
sectional analyses for each year, an industry cross-sectional analysis using the averaged variables is performed to mitigate 
the impact of outliers in each year. I require there are at least 20 companies in an industry to make a meaningful 
interpretation from the analysis. As a result, the research covers 67 industries with 69 companies on average in an industry. 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
The different numbers of observations are used for the analyses of P/E ratios, earnings forecasts, target prices and 
recommendations to preserve the maximum numbers of data. This is because the purpose of the research is to draw a 
general conclusion of the industry leader premium given available data rather than to design a forecasting model using all 
variables. Descriptive statistics are explained in table 1. 
<Table 1 here> 
Sample is categorised in the GICS group-level, instead of the sub-industry level, due to the limitation in space. For the 
analysis of P/E ratios, 26,315 observations are used, followed by 21,376 observations for recommendations, 13,987 for 
target prices and 13,057 for earnings forecasts. The biggest group is capital goods accounting for 19% of observations. 
The capital goods group includes industries of aerospace and defence, building products, construction and engineering, 
electrical components and equipment, industrial machinery, and trading companies and distributors. The numbers of 
companies in industries (not reported) range from 20 for paper products to 167 for industrial machinery. The average 
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number of companies in an industry is 69. As widely reported in the literature of analyst forecasts, analyst recommendations 
have bias toward a buy signal with 2.36 on average, considering the scale of 1 (strong buy), 3 (hold) and 5 (strong sell). 
Target prices and earnings forecasts also have upward bias as their means are above 1 in the relative measures (Chan et 
al., 2003; Dugar and Nathan, 1995; Hunton and McEwen, 1997; Lin and McNichols, 1998; McNichols and O’Brien, 1997). 
Industry Leader Premium 
Panel A of table 2 describes how P/E ratios change along ranks. Model 1 supports the current knowledge of P/E ratios and 
the hypothesis 1 that smaller companies tend to have higher P/E ratios in general (Cheng, 2005; Frankel and Lee, 1998). 
However, when companies are divided into large and small companies in model 2, large companies have structurally lower 
P/E ratios than small companies. Interestingly, the positive slope observed in model 1 disappears in model 2 indicating the 
positive trend is mainly due to a structural difference in P/E ratios between the two groups and, within each group, the 
increase is minimal. Model 3 further divides large companies into large-three and large-medium companies. Although large-
medium companies have significantly lower P/E ratios than small companies, the P/E ratios of large-three companies are 
not significantly different from those of small companies. This is in contrast to the general knowledge that larger companies 
tend to have lower P/E ratios. Although the coefficient on rank in model 3 is statistically significant, I believe its economic 
significance is limited. For example, given the fact that there are 69 companies on average in an industry, the difference of 
P/E ratios between the largest and smallest company would become only 0.21. This suggests P/E ratios are determined 
more by in which group companies belong than their ranks. Model 4 is identical to model 3 only changing a baseline 
intercept from small companies to large-medium companies. The result supports the industry leader premium hypothesis 
that industry leaders have significantly higher P/E ratios by 0.65 than their peers.  
Panel B is a supplementary analysis to examine the robustness of the results in panel A by controlling the earnings growth 
potentials of companies. The result of model 1 indicates the generally positive slope observed in panel A is indeed due to 
the high earnings growth potentials of small companies. When growth potentials are controlled, the positive slope 
disappears and in fact turns into the negative. The negative effect of large companies observed in model 2 of panel A also 
disappears, suggesting there is no significant difference in P/E ratios between large and small companies when their 
earnings potentials are controlled. However, the largest three companies still have significantly high P/E ratios and, when 
earnings potentials are controlled, their P/E ratios are even higher than those of small companies. Model 4 suggests 
industry leaders have significantly higher P/E ratios by 0.75 compared to their peers when earnings potentials are 
controlled, indicating the high P/E ratios of industry leaders are not due to their high earnings growth potentials but from 
other sources. Figure 1, 2 and 3 depict the result of model 1, 2 and 3 of panel A, respectively. Figure 1 and 2 describe what 
we currently know about P/E ratios and figure 3 modifies that perspective by identifying the industry leader premium. 
<Table 2 here> 
<Figure 1, 2 & 3 here> 
To examine how analysts consider industry leaders, table 3 reports the results of relative earnings forecasts along ranks. 
In panel A, for one-year ahead earnings forecasts, model 1 indicates smaller companies generally have higher earnings 
growth potentials. When the sample is divided into two groups, large companies have significantly lower earnings growth 
potentials than small companies. Interestingly, large-three companies have even lower earnings growth potentials than 
large-medium companies. Similar results are observed for two-year ahead earnings forecasts in panel B, except difference 
in earnings forecasts between large-three and large-medium companies is insignificant. The results support the findings in 
table 2 that the significantly higher P/E ratios of industry leaders are not from their high earnings growth potentials.  
<Table 3 here> 
Table 4 illustrates the results of relative target prices. Consistent with earnings forecasts, smaller companies tend to have 
higher target prices. When the sample is divided into two groups in model 2, large companies have significantly lower target 
prices than small companies. The difference between large-three and large-medium companies is insignificant, indicating 
analysts do not treat them separately in forecasting their target prices.  
<Table 4 here> 
The results of recommendations in table 5 are expected to be similar to those of target prices because they are the two 
different formats of the same opinion. Model 1 and 2 indicate large companies are more likely to receive sell 
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recommendations than small companies. When large companies are further divided, large-three companies have 
significantly higher tendency to receive sell recommendations than their peers. Overall, the results suggest analysts do not 
differentiate industry leaders in their forecasting but follow the general perception that large companies are more mature 
that they have lower earnings growth potentials, followed by more negative outlook in their stock performances. 
<Table 5 here> 
Why does a discrepancy occur between the results of P/E ratios and analyst forecasts? An exact answer is difficult to know. 
However, I suspect this is due to either analysts recommend shares only based on their earnings growth potentials 
(Abarbanell and Bushee, 1997; Elliot et al., 1995; Loh and Mian, 2006) or analysts interpret the high P/E ratios of industry 
leaders as they are over-valued. In either case, the findings suggest the industry leader premium, observed in the market, 
is not recognised by analysts.   
Conclusion 
What are the benefits of being an industry leader? This research aims to answer this question by taking the perspective of 
shareholders and measure how much premium an industry leader has in its valuation. In regard to a P/E ratio, there are 
three plausible but conflicting hypotheses. The first hypothesis suggests a P/E ratio is an indicator of earnings growth 
potential and, therefore, smaller companies tend to have higher P/E ratios. The second hypothesis suggests a P/E ratio is 
an indicator of over/under-valuation and, therefore, companies in the same industry would have similar or same P/E ratios. 
These two hypotheses represent the current knowledge of a P/E ratio. The third hypothesis suggests industry leaders would 
have higher P/E ratios than their peers due to premiums they enjoy. 
The findings indicate all three hypotheses coexist in an industry. In general, hypothesis 1 prevails. However, when 
companies are divided into different groups, hypothesis 2 exists within each group. Between the three largest and other 
large companies, the three largest companies have significantly higher P/E ratios than their peers, indicating the industry 
leader premium. The study of earnings forecasts suggests this is not due to their high earnings growth potentials but from 
other sources. However, the results of target prices and recommendations demonstrate that analysts do not know or 
recognise the industry leader premium yet and interpret their high P/E ratios as the sign of over-valuation. 
The paper contributes new knowledge to the behaviour of a P/E ratio. By identifying the industry leader premium, the 
research discovers the new structure of a P/E ratio, figure 3, from the current understanding of figure 1 and 2. The practical 
implication for analysts is to recognise the industry leader premium before concluding that their high P/E ratios mean they 
are over-valued. 
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TABLE 1 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Sample is displayed in the GICS group level instead of the sub-industry level. 22 groups and 67 sub-industries are covered 
in the research. The different numbers of observations are used for the analyses of P/E ratios, recommendations, target 
prices and earnings forecasts to draw a general conclusion from maximum available data. For the analyses of target prices 
and earnings forecasts, relative forecasts are used instead of absolute forecasts to eliminate the scale effect. EPS 
represents current earnings-per-share, EPS1 is one-year ahead earnings-per-share forecasts and EPS2 is two-year ahead 
earnings-per-share forecasts. 
 
Group Observations Frequency 
No. 
Companies 
Market 
Value 
(mil) 
Sales 
(mil) P/E 
Recommendation 
(5: strong sell; 
1: strong buy) 
Target 
Price/ 
Current 
Price 
EPS1/ 
EPS 
EPS2/ 
EPS 
Energy 645 2% 29 2,602 1,679 18.39 2.22 0.96 1.26 1.65 
Materials 1,702 6% 33 3,346 4,442 17.26 2.40 1.27 1.31 1.54 
Capital Goods 5,060 19% 104 2,195 3,594 17.22 2.37 1.28 1.24 1.50 
Commercial  & 
Professional 
Services 
1,365 5% 34 649 873 19.61 2.13 1.32 1.27 1.58 
Transportation 277 1% 38 5,052 9,111 14.91 2.46 0.98 1.28 1.67 
Automobiles & 
Components 
292 1% 34 673 1,561 16.60 2.37 1.28   
Consumer 
Durables & Apparel 
2,235 8% 36 1,369 1,251 19.81 2.35 1.29 1.28 1.56 
Media 1,144 4% 49 1,085 785 22.13 2.34 1.30 1.28 1.57 
Retailing 203 1% 25 353 1,002 20.92     
Food & Staples 
Retailing 
241 1% 24 4,033 10,176 18.45 2.55 1.16 1.13 1.32 
Food, Beverage & 
Tobacco 
1,851 7% 82 3,203 2,825 19.07 2.43 1.24 1.24 1.46 
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Household & 
Personal Products 
591 2% 35 3,772 1,646 22.93 2.32 1.19 1.30 1.75 
Pharmaceuticals, 
Biotechnology & 
Life Sciences 
439 2% 51 38,128 14,402 21.67 2.28 1.47 1.19 1.42 
Banks 1,906 7% 101 17,668 12,741 15.51 2.77 1.20 1.13 1.33 
Diversified 
Financials 
1,907 7% 91 1,246 766 19.54 2.27 1.38 1.21 1.44 
Insurance 287 1% 30 9,406 18,731 16.09 2.49 1.20 1.26 1.46 
Real Estate 1,692 6% 76 870 223 19.52 2.39 1.28 1.11 1.22 
Software & 
Services 
2,214 8% 94 577 438 22.30 2.26 1.35 1.38 1.87 
Technology 
Hardware & 
Equipment 
1,094 4% 53 4,467 2,521 20.52 2.40 1.26 1.35 1.76 
Semiconductors & 
Semiconductor 
Equipment 
189 1% 27 1,546 617 25.53 2.44 1.21 1.54 2.38 
Telecommunication 
Services 
312 1% 37 60,641 39,933 17.78 2.45 1.23 1.20 1.47 
Utilities 741 3% 30 14,082 13,664 19.44 2.42 1.34 1.12 1.28 
Mean 2,210 5% 69 4,835 4,088 19.02 2.36 1.28 1.26 1.55 
N 26,315 100% 
 
26,315 26,315 26,315 21,376 13,987 13,057 13,057 
 
TABLE 2 
P/E RATIOS OF INDUSTRY LEADERS 
The industry leader premium is measured as difference between the P/E ratios of the three largest companies and their 
peers. Model 1 represents the general trend of P/E ratios along ranks. Model 2 separates the sample equally into large and 
small companies. Model 3 further divides large companies into the three largest and other large companies. Model 4 is 
identical to model 3 except a baseline intercept. Model 4 uses large-medium companies as a base intercept, instead of 
small companies, to measure the significance of the industry leader premium directly. A company with the largest sales 
ranks first, followed by the second largest ranks second, and so on. Panel B is a supplementary analysis controlling the 
earnings growth potentials of companies to examine the robustness of the results in panel A. *, ** and *** represent 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Panel A         
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
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Intercept 16.090 
(0.081) 
*** 16.629 
(0.102) 
*** 16.561 
(0.103) 
*** 15.845 
(0.084) 
*** 
Rank 0.007 
(0.001) 
*** 0.001 
(0.001) 
 0.003 
(0.001) 
** 0.003 
(0.001) 
** 
Large   -0.680 
(0.079) 
***     
Large3     -0.068 
(0.135) 
 0.649 
(0.117) 
*** 
LargeMed     -0.717 
(0.079) 
***   
Small       0.717 
(0.079) 
*** 
Leverage -0.005 
(0.000) 
*** -0.005 
(0.000) 
*** -0.005 
(0.000) 
*** -0.005 
(0.000) 
*** 
DivPayout -0.008 
(0.002) 
*** -0.007 
(0.002) 
*** -0.007 
(0.002) 
*** -0.007 
(0.002) 
*** 
R2 0.026  0.028  0.029  0.029  
N 26,315  26,315  26,315  26,315  
         
Panel B         
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
Intercept 14.242 
(0.260) 
*** 14.360 
(0.282) 
*** 14.165 
(0.283) 
*** 14.025 
(0.261) 
*** 
Rank -0.010 
(0.002) 
*** -0.011 
(0.002) 
*** -0.007 
(0.002) 
*** -0.007 
(0.002) 
*** 
Large   -0.117 
(0.108) 
     
Large3     0.611 
(0.154) 
*** 0.752 
(0.114) 
*** 
LargeMed     -0.141 
(0.108) 
   
Small       0.141 
(0.108) 
 
Leverage -0.005 
(0.000) 
*** -0.005 
(0.000) 
*** -0.005 
(0.000) 
*** -0.005 
(0.000) 
*** 
DivPayout 0.004 
(0.003) 
 0.004 
(0.003) 
* 0.004 
(0.003) 
 0.004 
(0.003) 
 
EPS1/EPS -4.309 
(0.342) 
*** -4.311 
(0.342) 
*** -4.256 
(0.342) 
*** -4.256 
(0.342) 
*** 
EPS2/EPS 5.017 
(0.226) 
*** 5.008 
(0.226) 
*** 5.001 
(0.225) 
*** 5.001 
(0.225) 
*** 
R2 0.080  0.080  0.083  0.083  
N 13,488  13,488  13,488  13,488  
FIGURE 1 
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The result of model 1 of panel A in table 2. It represents the general trend of P/E ratios along ranks. A higher rank means 
a smaller company. 
 
FIGURE 2 
The result of model 2 of panel A in table 2. It represents the structure of P/E ratios when companies are equally divided 
into large and small companies. A higher rank means a smaller company. 
 
FIGURE 3 
The result of model 3 and 4 of panel A in table 2. It represents the structure of P/E ratios when large companies are further 
divided into the three largest and other large companies. A higher rank means a smaller company. 
 
TABLE 3 
EARNINGS FORECASTS OF INDUSTRY LEADERS 
Panel A and B measure the impact of ranks on one- and two-year ahead earnings forecasts, respectively. Earnings 
forecasts in a dependent variable are relative earnings forecasts measured as EPS forecasts divided by current EPS. Model 
1 represents the general trend of earnings forecasts along ranks. Model 2 separates the sample equally into large and 
small companies. Model 3 further divides large companies into the three largest and other large companies. Model 4 is 
identical to model 3 except a baseline intercept. Model 4 uses large-medium companies as a base intercept, instead of 
small companies, to measure the significance for industry leaders directly. *, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Panel A: One-Year Ahead Earnings Forecast 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
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Intercept 1.106 
(0.003) 
*** 1.124 
(0.005) 
*** 1.127 
(0.005) 
*** 1.109 
(0.003) 
*** 
Rank 0.001 
(0.000) 
*** 0.000 
(0.000) 
*** 0.000 
(0.000) 
** 0.000 
(0.000) 
** 
Large   -0.018 
(0.005) 
***     
Large3     -0.032 
(0.007) 
*** -0.014 
(0.006) 
** 
LargeMed     -0.017 
(0.005) 
***   
Small       0.017 
(0.005) 
*** 
R2 0.003  0.004  0.005  0.005  
N 13,057  13,057  13,057  13,057  
         
Panel B: Two-Year Ahead Earnings Forecast 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
Intercept 1.266 
(0.004) 
*** 1.305 
(0.008) 
*** 1.308 
(0.008) 
*** 1.269 
(0.005) 
*** 
Rank 0.002 
(0.000) 
*** 0.001 
(0.000) 
*** 0.001 
(0.000) 
*** 0.001 
(0.000) 
*** 
Large   -0.040 
(0.007) 
***     
Large3     -0.054 
(0.011) 
*** -0.015 
(0.009) 
 
LargeMed     -0.039 
(0.007) 
***   
Small       0.039 
(0.007) 
*** 
 
R2 0.011  0.014  0.014  0.014  
N 13,057  13,057  13,057  13,057  
TABLE 4 
TARGET PRICES OF INDUSTRY LEADERS 
Target prices in a dependent variable are relative target prices measured as target prices divided by current prices. Model 
1 represents the general trend of target prices along ranks. Model 2 separates the sample equally into large and small 
companies. Model 3 further divides large companies into the three largest and other large companies. Model 4 is identical 
to model 3 except a baseline intercept. Model 4 uses large-medium companies as a base intercept, instead of small 
companies, to measure the significance for industry leaders directly. *, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively. 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
Intercept 1.104 
(0.004) 
*** 1.223 
(0.007) 
*** 1.222 
(0.007) 
*** 1.097 
(0.004) 
*** 
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Rank 0.004 
(0.000) 
*** 0.002 
(0.000) 
*** 0.002 
(0.000) 
*** 0.002 
(0.000) 
*** 
Large   -0.125 
(0.006) 
***     
Large3     -0.123 
(0.010) 
*** 0.002 
(0.008) 
 
LargeMed     -0.125 
(0.006) 
***   
Small       0.125 
(0.006) 
*** 
R2 0.067  0.091  0.091  0.091  
N 13,987  13,987  13,987  13,987  
 
TABLE 5 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF INDUSTRY LEADERS 
Recommendations scale from 1 (strong buy) through 3 (hold) to 5 (strong sell). Model 1 represents the general trend of 
recommendations along ranks. Model 2 separates the sample equally into large and small companies. Model 3 further 
divides large companies into the three largest and other large companies. Model 4 is identical to model 3 except a baseline 
intercept. Model 4 uses large-medium companies as a base intercept, instead of small companies, to measure the 
significance for industry leaders directly. *, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
Intercept 2.419 
(0.005) 
*** 2.169 
(0.009) 
*** 2.163 
(0.009) 
*** 2.425 
(0.005) 
*** 
Rank -0.005 
(0.000) 
*** -0.002 
(0.000) 
*** -0.001 
(0.000) 
*** -0.001 
(0.000) 
*** 
Large   0.263 
(0.008) 
***     
Large3     0.293 
(0.013) 
*** 0.032 
(0.011) 
*** 
LargeMed     0.261 
(0.008) 
***   
Small       -0.261 
(0.008) 
*** 
R2 0.055  0.103  0.104  0.104  
N 21,376  21,376  21,376  21,376  
 
  
